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LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the text of the Supplemental Award of the Arbitral Tribunal for the Dispute over the Inter-Entity Boundary in the Brčko Area, dated 15 March 1998 (see annex).

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07053 (E) 190398

/...

Annex

ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL FOR
DISPUTE OVER INTER-ENTITY BOUNDARY IN BRCKO AREA

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	)	
v.	)	Arbitration for the Brcko Area
The Republika Srpska	)	

SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD

15 March 1998

Appearances:

For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Frank McCloskey
Edward O. DeLaney
Barnes & Thornburg

Jay D. Zeller
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

For the Republika Srpska:

Nikola Kostich
Styler Kostich LeBell Dobroski & McGuire

John M. Adams

/...

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I INTRODUCTION

1. This Tribunal's Award of 14 February 1997 (hereinafter "the Award") established an international supervisory regime in the disputed Brcko region but concluded that it would be inappropriate at that time to make a judgment as to what "final allocation of political responsibilities . . . following the period of interim supervision" would best achieve implementation of the Dayton Accords and the development of representative local government in the Brcko area. Award Para. 104(II)(A). It also authorized either party to request, between 1 December 1997 and 15 January 1998, further action affecting the Award with respect to the allocation of political responsibilities in the area. Id. A timely request was made by the Federation; the Tribunal then conferred with counsel for the parties and adopted an agreed schedule for written submissions and oral hearings; eight full days of hearings were held in Vienna in the period 5-12 February 1998; and the parties' final written submissions were completed on 4 March 1998.[1]

II. THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PARTIES

2. As indicated in the Award, the principal source of the legal and equitable principles that must guide this Tribunal is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, referred to hereinafter as the "Dayton Accords". Under those Accords this Tribunal has a duty to allocate political responsibilities in the Brcko area in such a way as to give the fullest possible effect to Dayton's commands for country-wide freedom of movement, the return of displaced persons and refugees, the re-establishment of a multi-ethnic society, and the democratization of the political process -- all in the interests of

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[1] As of this writing the two party-appointed members of the Tribunal, Professor Cazim Sadikovic and Dr. Vitomir Popovic, have not joined in this Supplemental Award. Following the Vienna hearings, all three members of the Tribunal met and deliberated and exchanged views, and Messrs. Sadikovic and Popovic subsequently expanded their views in detailed letters to the Presiding Arbitrator. These documents make clear that a 2-1 majority decision now is impossible, with the result that "the decision of the Presiding Arbitrator will be final and binding upon both parties." See Award Para. 5.

regional and international peace. See Award Paras. 95-99. Under this mandate the Tribunal must "review the facts as to whether these principles are now being honored in the disputed area, and as to how such compliance might be assured in the future." Award Para. 83.

3. To ease inter-Entity tensions in the Brcko area and maximize the parties' compliance with the Dayton Accords during 1997, the Award provided for the installation of an international supervisor with authority to issue such orders and regulations as might be necessary to guide the parties toward full Dayton compliance and to promote and protect the legitimate interests of both parties in the Brcko area. In addition, the Award essentially put the parties on notice that in any further proceedings the Tribunal would pay close attention to the parties' subsequent compliance records. Accordingly, the central factual issues upon which both parties focussed their attention during the Vienna hearings were: first, the extent to which the parties had succeeded in achieving compliance with the Dayton Accords over the preceding 12 months; and, second, the degree to which each Entity could be expected to serve as a reliable "guardian" of the parties' interests in the future.

4. Without attempting here to summarize all of the hearing evidence, the main themes of the testimony were these:

(a) The Federation came forward with voluminous evidence to show that throughout 1997 officials of Republika Srpska ("the RS") -- in flagrant violation of the Dayton Accords and the Award -- stubbornly resisted all efforts by the Supervisor and the Federation to achieve, within the Brcko area, freedom of movement, the return of displaced persons and refugees, and the establishment of democratic multi-ethnic government. In light of this obstructionism, Federation President Ejup Ganic testified in support of the Federation's claim to have Brcko transferred to the Federation, arguing that such a step was necessary to achieve "justice" in two respects: all former residents of Brcko should be allowed to return and reoccupy their Brcko homes, and the Federation's citizens generally should enjoy an open economic gateway through Brcko to Croatia and the rest of Europe. Recalling that Serb forces ethnically cleansed the Brcko area during the war and asserting that, as evidenced by certain recent political developments noted below (see Paras. 9-11.

infra), the RS now is allegedly in a state of "disarray," the Federation argued that the RS cannot be trusted to adequately safeguard Federation interests in the area.

(b) At the hearings the RS laid heavy emphasis on its interest in territorial continuity (i.e., in maintaining the Brcko corridor connection between the RS's eastern and western halves), the theory being that maintenance of such a corridor under the exclusive control of the RS is absolutely vital strategically in order to allow (for example) RS armed forces to move as necessary throughout the Entity. To the RS, any thought of placing the Brcko corridor under Federation control is an anathema, particularly because of the alleged "disunity" within the Federation government.

III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE FEBRUARY 1997 AWARD

5. As a threshold matter, in seeking to achieve an "equitable result" (see Award Para. 88), the Tribunal must consider the events of 1997 and the latest political developments as they may affect the Brcko area and the prospects of long-term compliance with the Dayton Accords. In reaching the decision articulated below, therefore, the Tribunal has relied upon the following facts established by the evidence submitted by the parties during the course of the arbitration.[2/]

6. In March 1997 U.S. Ambassador Robert W. Farrand was selected to serve as the Supervisor in the Brcko area. Since April, when he actually arrived on the scene, Ambassador Farrand and his staff have vigorously and skillfully pressed forward with the herculean task of building, from scratch, new programs for achieving real freedom of movement in the area, bringing about the return to Brcko of former residents (particularly Bosniac and Croat residents), creating a whole new system of multi-ethnic municipal government, and revitalizing the local economy.

2/ Given the decision articulated below, it is necessary here only to summarize certain key facts, rather than present detailed findings of fact.

7. Despite the tremendous efforts of the supervisory team, the hearing record clearly establishes that throughout the last year RS authorities in Brcko, directed by the Serbian Democratic Party ("SDS") headquartered in Pale, effectively resisted all of the supervisory programs looking toward Dayton compliance in the Brcko area. To give a few examples, the RS police in Brcko, acting on the orders of the Pale-controlled Minister of the Interior, systematically thwarted freedom of movement north of the IEBL in various ways including the use of illegal checkpoints and unjustified arrests; there was systematic intimidation of any Bosniacs or Croats who explored the possibility of returning to their former homes in the area; those few Bosniac and Croat families who still lived in the area were put under pressure to leave; on 1 May 1997, when a Bosniac group came to Brcko to confer with the Supervisor, they were stoned as they left, and no one was prosecuted; on 28 August 1997 a major riot and an attack, apparently sponsored by Pale, were launched not only on visiting Bosniacs but on IPTF, SFOR, and other international personnel, causing many injuries and great property damage, again without any subsequent prosecution; and in advance of the September municipal elections, the SDS caused such serious registration irregularities that the registration process had to be cancelled and restarted under increased international supervision.[3/] The apparent objective of all these Pale-sponsored Dayton violations was to maintain the Serbs-only "ethnic purity" of the region and thus completely frustrate the Dayton objective of returning Bosnia and Herzegovina to its pre-war multi-ethnicity.

8. This is not to say that the Federation's record of compliance with the letter and spirit of the Dayton Accords was perfect. For example, there is considerable evidence that Federation authorities have acted to inhibit the return of former Serb residents to Sarajevo and other communities within the Federation. The absence of full Dayton implementation in the Sarajevo area is particularly relevant because several thousand Serbs who formerly lived in Sarajevo are now living in the Brcko homes of Bosniacs and Croats who would like to

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3/ Even during the second registration the SDS caused such serious irregularities that election authorities imposed penalties on the SDS (whose first three candidates were removed from the party's list) and the head of the local election commission in Brcko (who was docked one month's pay).

return to Brcko -- but cannot do so because the Serbs occupying their Brcko homes are unable to return to Sarajevo. Thus while Federation authorities complain that the RS has been refusing to let Bosniac and Croat DPs return to Brcko, to a substantial degree they themselves are contributing to the problem. See generally Sarajevo Declaration of 3 February 1998. Nonetheless, during much of 1997 the RS's systematic resistance to Dayton in the Brcko area appeared clearly to be tipping the balance of the equities in favor of the Federation's claim to either exclusive or shared control of Brcko.

9. Although that was the situation through much of 1997, the political picture in the RS began to change in July of that year. A serious and public rift opened up between the SDS Pale leadership (including Messrs. Karadzic, Krajisnik, and Buha) and President Biljana Plavsic, who separated herself from the Pale group and set up her own headquarters in Banja Luka. While the old SDS nationalist anti-Dayton themes continued to dominate the political rhetoric in the eastern part of the RS and in Brcko, Mrs. Plavsic moved to a more progressive stance, separated herself from the SDS, formed a new party (the SNS), and began to embrace the Dayton Accords with apparent enthusiasm. The rift between the two elements has steadily widened since July.

10. An event which may (or may not) turn out to be a vital turning point occurred on 18 January 1998. At that time various groups in the RS National Assembly, including supporters of Mrs. Plavsic, broke away from earlier alignments and installed Milorad Dodik as Prime Minister of the RS in outright defiance of the SDS. In a speech given that night Mr. Dodik openly rejected the philosophy of the SDS, called upon the RS to comply with "the European Convention on Human Rights as an integral part of the Dayton Agreement," espoused the principle of regional democratic governments throughout the RS, criticized "the previous government" for having "obstructed the Dayton agreement in every way possible," and called for the complete "democratization" of RS society.

11. The possibility that the emergence of Mr. Dodik represents a fundamental change in direction in RS politics (as distinguished from a short-lived effort to influence this arbitration

proceeding) receives support from Mr. Dodik's testimony before this Tribunal. Declaring that he had never been a member of the SDS and had always opposed nationalism, Mr. Dodik described in detail a whole series of reforms that he had managed to put in place within the first 20 days of his elevation, all pointing toward a rejection of SDS principles and future cooperation with the Federation. Although he said he strongly favors keeping Brcko within RS territory, he went on to say that, if nationalist politics were put to one side and Bosnia and Herzegovina became truly democratic, the "IEBL will be an irrelevant issue" -- apparently meaning that the IEBL would cease to have any more political effect than the border between, for example, two internal political districts of a Western European country. He specifically agreed that Bosniacs and Croats should be permitted to return to Brcko and that they should be allowed to control the local administration in Brcko if they earned that right at the ballot box.

12. In the Tribunal's view, the most impressive point made by Mr. Dodik was and is his recognition of the ideal that Bosnia and Herzegovina should become such an integrated multi-ethnic democratic state that the boundary between the two Entities will cease to be relevant. This position suggests the possibility that, if Mr. Dodik survives politically through the RS election scheduled for September 1998 -- and if at the end of the year he and his colleagues in the new RS government still appear to be moving toward his declared objective -- the equities of the situation will be much more evenly balanced than they are today. Conversely, the coming months obviously could bring a very different result: Mr. Dodik may lose his influence or change his position, in which case the RS's claim to exclusive control of the area would be seriously jeopardized.

IV. THE NEED FOR CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

13. Since some witnesses at the Vienna hearings called for the immediate termination of the international supervisory regime that was established by the Award, the Tribunal will turn first to the question of whether or not to continue the interim international supervisory regime in the Brcko area.

14. The short answer is that, no matter what ruling the Tribunal might now make on the question of the location of the IEBL, there would be an evident need for continuing international supervision well into the future. Specifically, any change in the status of Brcko (by placing it within Federation territory or creating a "neutral district") would bring with it a need for supervision during the period of adjustment -- and, in light of the RS's continuing course of conduct since Dayton and continuing tensions in the area, the same sort of regime would be required for maintenance of the status quo. In fact, this continuing need has been recognized by senior leaders of both Entities, who have acknowledged that, no matter what the Tribunal's ruling today, some level of international supervision should continue in order to reduce existing tensions in the area. Given Supervisor Farrand's hearing testimony that the new multi-ethnic institutions which he has been nurturing in the Brcko area are still very "shallowly rooted" -- and particularly given the continuing influence of the SDS in the Brcko area -- the need to continue the current supervisory regime for a further period of time seems overwhelmingly clear.[4/] This Supplemental Award provides accordingly.

V. THE TIMING OF A FINAL IEBL DECISION

15. There are powerful arguments in favor of an immediate final ruling on the question of the proper location of the IEBL in the Brcko area -- i.e., whether the area in dispute should be transferred to the Federation, whether it should remain within the territory of the RS, or whether it should be declared a "special" or "neutral district" in the manner forecast in the

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4/ Although the new institutions may be 'shallowly rooted," Ambassador Farrand and his staff have managed to achieve substantial progress, particularly in the last few weeks. A multi-ethnic Municipal Assembly, Administration, and Judiciary are in place; the Returns Commission established by Ambassador Farrand has managed to achieve larger returns of DPs and refugees into the Brcko area than has been accomplished throughout all the rest of the RS; and the multi-ethnic police force under IPTF monitoring is policing significant new traffic over the Brcko highway bridge to Croatia and is now patrolling throughout all areas of the city of Brcko as well as outlying districts. Since all projects are still in the fledgling stage, continuing international supervision is absolutely vital to their continued progress and health.

Award. See Award Para. 103.[3] Some of the considerations are these: (a) the Award contemplated a final decision now; (b) both parties claim that they want such a decision now; and (c) the Tribunal would welcome the opportunity to close the case and dissolve.

16. On the other hand, before bowing to these considerations the Tribunal must consider whether the time is yet ripe for the adoption of what is intended to be "a long term peaceful solution." Award Para. 97. Although some progress has been made, there continue to exist today several of the same factors that prompted the Tribunal a year ago to hold in abeyance the final allocation of political control in the Brcko area. Most importantly, tensions and instability in the region remain high, primarily because of the resistance of the SDS leadership to the Supervisor's efforts to promote Dayton compliance. The Tribunal must also take note of the facts that the joint institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina have not yet become fully effective and that various Entity institutions are still struggling with organizational problems.

17. Moreover, it seems clear to the Tribunal that a reasonable delay in the IEBL decision is likely to provide the Tribunal with a firmer foundation for selecting the most equitable result. As of this writing, it seems entirely possible, given recent developments, that at the end of the current year there will have been a significant change in the RS government's posture toward Dayton compliance and cooperation with the Federation -- in which event the solution that would be adopted today might well turn out, in hindsight, to have been less equitable than it could have been. To be specific, as of the end of 1997 the circumstances suggested the need for an outright transfer of Brcko to the Federation, which would have given that Entity exclusive control of Brcko when the supervisory regime ends -- and yet

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[3] Although this is not the time to discuss the matter in any depth, the Tribunal has preliminary doubts as to the validity of the RS's repeated suggestions that any "neutral district" solution would violate either the alleged Dayton 51-49 percent principle or the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina or both. We intend to keep an open mind on the issue, but our preliminary analysis indicates that it would be perfectly possible to devise a "neutral district" solution that would not be vulnerable to either criticism.

significant changes in the RS political scenery by the end of 1998 could well make one of the alternative solutions more equitable and more conducive to regional stability over the long run. Recognizing that such a delay will create another period of uncertainty, we nonetheless believe that the potential long-term benefits of a delay, in terms of the equities, are worth the cost of uncertainty for a few more months.

18. It is important to consider whether such a postponement, which would obviously benefit the RS, would be likely to do injury to the interests of the Federation. Our conclusion is that those interests should be well protected in the interim by the multiple shields of the international community. As noted above (see Para. 4, supra), Federation President Ganic's testimony focussed primarily on the interests of all Federation citizens in having former residents of Brcko return to their Brcko homes and in achieving an open economic gateway through Brcko to European markets. Under the Dayton Accords, of course, both interests are completely legitimate, and the Tribunal has every confidence that during the period of delay these interests will be amply protected and promoted by the combined forces of the Supervisor, the new Brcko multi-ethnic governmental institutions (which include a multi-ethnic police force), the IPTF and SFOR. Moreover, the proposed delay may well benefit the Federation: if it provides time for the progressive forces in the RS to gather strength and begin to cooperate with the Federation and the Supervisor's compliance programs, all of Bosnia and Herzegovina will benefit;[4] and, conversely, if the opposite occurs, the Federation's claim to exclusive control of Brcko will be that much

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[4] Just as one example, the press reported on 27 February 1998 that, as a result of new RS attitudes, railroad traffic between the two Entities is starting up for the first time since 1991.

stronger.[2] Indeed, the resulting benefits should continue not only through the postponement period but throughout the period of international supervision and beyond.

19. All things considered, we incline to the view that the final IEBL decision should be deferred until early 1999, at which point the Tribunal will be able to take into account any significant developments that may have occurred in this critical period of change. This Supplemental Award therefore provides for a final arbitration phase at the end of 1998.[3]

20. Referring to the Tribunal's duty to act according to "relevant legal and equitable principles," some may argue that the foregoing rulings are improperly based on purely "political" considerations and lack any adequate basis in law or equity. For reasons previously explained, we disagree. One of the unique qualities of the present arbitration is that it inherently encompasses political considerations, requiring as it does that the Tribunal allocate political responsibilities between the Entities in a manner that will advance the goals of Dayton. Moreover, although the Tribunal has a duty to make a final decision as soon as "that can be done consistent with relevant legal and equitable principles" (Award Para. 102), it should not act until matters have become sufficiently stabilized to allow it to put in place a

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[2] During his hearing testimony President Ganic made a strong argument to the effect that, if uncertainty as to the location of the IEBL is allowed to continue beyond 15 March 1998, (a) economic investment in the area will be delayed, and (b) large numbers of Bosniac former residents of Brcko will decide to abandon any plans for return, with the result that it will no longer be possible to restore the pre-war multi-ethnic balance in Brcko. While acknowledging the force of Mr. Ganic's argument, the Tribunal believes that the outlook for a solid democratic multi-ethnic municipal regime is sufficiently bright today that the relatively brief delay being ordered now will not discourage would-be investors or returnees in significant numbers.

[3] The Tribunal recognizes that the delay of approximately one year creates the risk that if the international community should decide unexpectedly to withdraw its various Bosnian programs, including SFOR, during the year or shortly thereafter -- i.e., shortly after the Tribunal's IEBL decision -- enforcement of the latter decision would be at least problematic. On the other hand, for one year the risk of such withdrawal looks quite remote; there is every reason to believe that the various programs will continue well beyond that point. Such risks will, however, militate strongly against any additional delay beyond early 1999.

solution that is likely to endure over the long term. See Award Para. 101. We therefore think there is both legal and equitable justification for ordering a relatively short delay to collect additional facts relating both to probable future compliance with Dayton and the future relationship between the two Entities.

21. Finally, the Tribunal feels impelled to send an obvious but important message to the RS's political leaders: given the RS's systematic non-compliance with (indeed, defiance of) the Dayton Accords in the Brcko area for much if not all of 1997, the Tribunal's final IEBL decision in late 1998 or early 1999 will surely diminish the RS's position in the Brcko area unless the RS by that time has carried the burden of demonstrating very clearly that it has truly reversed course and committed itself to an apparently permanent program of full Dayton compliance and revitalization of the area. To carry that burden the RS will need to be in a position to show significant new achievements in terms of returns of former Brcko residents, unfettered freedom of movement, strong support for the multi-ethnic governmental institutions including the multi-ethnic police force, and full cooperation with the Supervisor and the authorities responsible for conducting fair and democratic elections in September 1998.[9] Thus, in any subsequent proceeding, the Tribunal will expect to receive from the RS evidence displaying a very vigorous and consistent program of correction and compliance throughout 1998.

22. Although the Federation's responsibilities for Dayton compliance in the Brcko area are of a lesser magnitude (given the present placement of the IEBL) than those of the RS, the Tribunal should warn the Federation that in the final IEBL decision its claims will be weakened by less than full compliance with the obligation to allow former Federation residents to return to their homes, particularly in Sarajevo. See Para. 8, supra.

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[9] A greater understanding of the potential consequences of a failure to achieve these goals may be gained from reviewing the very detailed "Proposed Final Order of the Arbitration Tribunal" that was submitted by counsel for the Federation and served on RS counsel near the conclusion of the present phase of the arbitration.

VI. SUPPLEMENTAL AWARD

23. For the foregoing reasons the Tribunal adopts the following orders and provisions, which shall form part of the Award, shall be binding upon all Parties to GFAP Annex 2, and with which all Parties shall comply and cooperate in full.

24. The supervisory regime established by the Award (at Para. 104(I)(B)) shall continue in existence, with the powers and responsibilities therein provided. The Supervisor, being Deputy High Representative for Brcko, shall enjoy in the Brcko area powers equivalent to those conferred upon the High Representative by the Bonn Conference of December 1997, including the power to remove from office any public official considered by the Supervisor to be inadequately cooperative with his efforts to achieve compliance with the Dayton Accords, to strengthen democratic institutions in the area, and to revitalize the local economy.

25. The Supervisor is authorized and encouraged to take appropriate measures toward economic revitalization, including steps (a) to re-integrate the economy of that portion of the pre-war Brcko Opstina that lies north of the IEBL with the economies of surrounding regions, (b) to create in the Brcko area a duty-free or special economic zone to stimulate the region's economy, (c) for the same purpose to establish a program of privatization of state-owned and socially-owned enterprises in the area, and (d), looking toward the re-opening of the Sava River port in Brcko, to activate the Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation and facilitate international support for the port program.

26. Pending further action by the Tribunal, to be taken upon the request of either party, the IEBL within the pre-war Brcko Opstina shall remain unchanged. The Tribunal will entertain and act upon any such request that is received between 15 November 1998 and 15 January 1999. A further decision by the Tribunal in response to such a request will be rendered as soon as possible after the request has been received.

27. The Tribunal hereby gives notice (1) that any further Tribunal action is likely to be significantly affected by the degree to which the respective parties have acted in good faith to comply with the Dayton Accords and the Tribunal's orders, and (2) that among the alternative solutions that will be seriously considered by the Tribunal, upon proper request, will be (a) the location or relocation of the IEBL in such a way as to place Brcko and its surroundings within the territory of one party or the other, and (b) the conversion of the pre-war Brcko Opstina into a "neutral district" beyond the exclusive control of either Entity.

VII. AUTHENTICITY

28. The English language text of this Supplemental Award shall be the authentic text for all purposes.

Robert B. Owen
Presiding Arbitrator

Cazim Sadikovic
Arbitrator

Vitomir Popovic
Arbitrator

15 March 1998

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FOURTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the presidential statement issued by the Security Council on 26 February 1998 (S/PRST/1998/5), by which the Council requested me to submit detailed proposals concerning the role of the United Nations and its future presence in Sierra Leone. It covers the developments in Sierra Leone since the issuance of my third report on 5 February 1998 (S/1998/103).

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1132 (1997)

Action taken by the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

2. On 5 February 1998, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Five on Sierra Leone came to New York to brief the members of the Security Council and myself on the situation in Sierra Leone. The Chairman of the Committee of Five, the Foreign Minister of Nigeria, Chief Tom Ikimi, said an impasse had been reached in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. He pointed out that the junta had raised three issues which, in its view, stood in the way of the implementation of the Agreement, namely, the release of Corporal Foday Sankoh, the proposed exemption of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces from the disarmament process and the composition of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) which consisted primarily of Nigerian troops.

3. Minister Ikimi noted that because of this impasse, ECOMOG had been unable to deploy in Sierra Leone to carry out the disarmament and demobilization of the Sierra Leonean combatants, and it had therefore not been possible to deploy United Nations military observers alongside ECOMOG.

4. Minister Ikimi requested my support in launching a high-level effort to support ECOWAS through the establishment of a group of friends of Sierra Leone, and expressed the view that the Security Council should endorse the 22 April 1998 deadline for the restoration of constitutional authority and the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement of 23 October 1997.

5. I reaffirmed to the Committee of Five the desire of the United Nations for close cooperation between the United Nations and ECOWAS, and stated that ECOMOG needed to develop a concept of operations on the basis of which the United Nations could finalize its own deployment plan. ECOMOG should also compile a statement of its own logistical requirements in order to attract the necessary support from potential donors.

6. On the same day, responding to an attack by junta forces on their position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the junta, which culminated approximately one week later in the collapse of the junta and its expulsion by force from Freetown after heavy fighting. The fall of the city on 13 February, which was accompanied by widespread looting and some reprisal killings, led to the flight or capture of many soldiers and leaders of the junta. ECOWAS has assured me that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been allowed to visit prisoners detained by ECOMOG in Freetown. However, some of the former leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), including its Chairman, Johnny Paul Koroma, are believed to be still at large. Acting in concert with the local Kamajors and other traditional hunter militia (known as the Civil Defence Unit), ECOMOG has subsequently taken control of the towns of Bo, Kenema and Zimmi in the south of the country, and Lunsar, Makeni and Kabala in the north. ECOMOG has also reported the capture of Daru, which would mean that the remnants of the junta have now been dislodged from every major town except for Kailahun. Following scattered fighting in the latter part of February, the country now appears to be quiet. A number of foreign aid workers and missionaries taken hostage by armed elements in February were later released unharmed. However, press reports in mid-March indicated that Revolutionary United Front (RUF) members in Kono had murdered civilians and taken 200 hostages, reportedly including foreign nationals.

7. On 18 February, accompanied by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Mr. Lansana Kouyaté, Minister Ikimi visited Sierra Leone to assess the situation on the ground. They interviewed some former junta soldiers now detained by ECOMOG and visited the State House complex and the Parliament buildings. Many of the government buildings were found to have been looted and were in poor condition, and a number of unexploded bombs were scattered about. However, the ECOWAS team, which was enthusiastically greeted by crowds, found that in many respects life had returned to normal in the capital. As noted below, my Special Envoy also visited Freetown on the same day.

8. From 25 to 27 February 1998, the Committee of Five met in the margins of the meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa to review the situation in Sierra Leone. The Committee issued a communiqué, which was subsequently circulated as document S/1998/170.

9. On 4 March 1998, the members of the Committee of Five returned to New York and met again with members of the Security Council and with me. Chief Ikimi briefed me on his visit to Freetown on 18 February and his subsequent meeting with President Tejan Kabbah in Conakry. Following this meeting, it was announced that President Kabbah would return to his country on 10 March 1998.

10. ECOMOG has also prepared a detailed list of logistical requirements for its operations in Sierra Leone. During the visit to New York of the Committee of

Five, Chief Ikimi requested the assistance of the United Nations and the international community in ensuring that these requirements could be met. That request was reaffirmed by the Chairman of ECOWAS, General Sani Abacha, in his statement at the ceremony held to mark the return of President Kabbah to Freetown on 10 March.

Action taken by the United Nations

11. On 18 February 1998, a few days after ECOMOG had established control over most of the city of Freetown, my Special Envoy, Mr. Francis G. Okelo, led a security and humanitarian assessment mission to the capital and to Lungi comprising United Nations and non-governmental organization officials. The mission determined the most immediate needs of the population. Mr. Okelo handed over a quantity of medicines donated by the World Health Organization (WHO) to local hospitals and began preparations for the re-establishment of a United Nations presence in Freetown. A few days later, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivered 857 metric tons of food to Freetown by ship.

12. Early in February, pursuant to a request by members of the Security Council for a technical assessment of the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone since the coup d'état of 25 May 1997, an inter-agency mission travelled to the subregion. Its report is contained in document S/1998/155. Further information on the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone can be found in section III of the present report.

13. Pursuant to the statement issued by the President of the Security Council on 26 February, I have initiated the necessary action to establish a Trust Fund for Sierra Leone. Contributions would help finance logistical assistance to ECOMOG, rehabilitation assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and activities, including disarmament, demobilization and human rights.

14. On 7 March 1998, my Special Envoy reopened the United Nations office in Freetown, which had been closed shortly after the 25 May 1997 coup d'état and was temporarily relocated in Conakry, Guinea. The office is now being strengthened to comprise civilian political and humanitarian officers, a military adviser and, in due course, human rights and civilian police advisers and public information personnel. The function of the office is to liaise with the Government of Sierra Leone, ECOWAS, ECOMOG and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations, and to act as the overall authority for all United Nations activities in the country. My proposals for deploying military liaison personnel as part of the United Nations presence on the ground can be found in section IV of the present report. My Special Envoy will also temporarily retain a small office in Conakry, but he expects to be fully established in Freetown by the end of March, thus paving the way for the return of all United Nations agencies to Sierra Leone.

Action taken by the Government of Sierra Leone

15. On 13 February 1998, President Kabbah called a meeting in Conakry of potential donors, including the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Nations, to discuss his Government's priorities; the nature of the assistance the international

community could provide; and the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance. The President announced that he had created a task force to prepare the ground for the resumption of work by his Government, to assess damage to the infrastructure and to prepare for the resumption of education. President Kabbah identified the immediate priorities of his Government as the provision of humanitarian supplies and petroleum products, the reactivation of international aid programmes and the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. Three other areas that required special attention have been identified as the training and restructuring of the police force, the creation of job opportunities for young people and the construction of low-cost housing. President Kabbah also indicated that he intended to streamline his administration and appoint technical experts to cabinet positions.

16. Following the removal by ECOMOG of the military junta from power, President Kabbah issued a statement announcing his intention to submit proposals to Parliament concerning the rebuilding of his country. The President also spoke out against the reprisal killings, which, in some cases, had accompanied the seizure of control from the junta.

17. On 10 March 1998, accompanied by General Sani Abacha, Chairman of ECOWAS and Head of State of Nigeria, as well as the Heads of State of Guinea, Mali and Niger, President Lansana Conteh, President Alpha Oumar Konare and President Ibrahim Bare Mainassara, and the Vice-President of Gambia, President Tejan Kabbah returned to Freetown to resume his office as Head of State of Sierra Leone. He was greeted by large and enthusiastic crowds. Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, delivered on my behalf a message of congratulations to the President stating that his return represented the accomplishment of a major objective not only of the people of Sierra Leone, but also of ECOWAS, OAU, the United Nations and the entire international community. I expressed my deep regret at the violence, loss of life and property and immense suffering undergone by the people of Sierra Leone since the coup d'état and extended my condolences to the families of those who lost their lives in opposing it. Furthermore, I informed the President that the United Nations looked forward to working closely with him in helping his Government to reassert its authority and strengthen its capacity throughout the country.

18. In a statement made at the ceremony marking his return to Sierra Leone, President Kabbah declared his intention to embark on the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction of the country, to form a broad-based Government and to appoint a policy advisory committee. In his first meeting with my Special Envoy after his return, President Kabbah stressed the need for an early deployment of United Nations military personnel, the urgent provision of humanitarian assistance and the prompt establishment of the Trust Fund for Sierra Leone.

Military and security situation in Sierra Leone

19. Freetown is now fully under the control of ECOMOG and is increasingly secure. Some unexploded ordnance and landmines have been found, but these are not a threat to security. The peninsula on which the capital stands has also been secured. With the capture of almost every other major town in the country,

and through its deployment further into the countryside in the north, south and east, ECOMOG has established itself successfully across most of the country.

20. Nevertheless, the fact that many of the senior junta leaders, including the former Chairman of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, have not thus far been apprehended, as well as the continuing violence inflicted on civilians during their retreat from ECOMOG forces by RUF and other armed elements, indicate that the security situation in Sierra Leone is still a source of concern. Though ECOMOG has begun to collect weapons in Freetown, a major disarmament, demobilization and reintegration exercise will be needed to ensure security.

21. ECOMOG has also developed a concept of operations for its deployment throughout Sierra Leone that sets out the preliminary planning for the disarmament and demobilization of Sierra Leonean combatants. In summary, the tasks ECOMOG has set for itself include:

(a) Deployment throughout Sierra Leone;

(b) Manning of selected entry points by land, sea or air in order to ensure that no arms, ammunition or war matériel are brought into the country;

(c) Disarmament of ex-combatants at designated sites;

(d) Establishment of road blocks to check the movement of arms and ammunition and to assist in extending protection to refugees and internally displaced persons;

(e) Conducting patrols to create an atmosphere conducive to freedom of movement and the restoration of established authority;

(f) Providing security for key individuals, United Nations personnel, including military personnel, and non-governmental organizations.

22. The plan calls for the deployment of 15,000 troops in four sectors: western, northern, southern and eastern. The western sector, comprising Freetown and the airports of Lungi and Hastings, is further subdivided, and would support the deployment of seven battalions, an air force detachment and an artillery brigade. This appears to be an ample level of force for the protection of the capital and its airport.

23. In the northern sector, ECOMOG would deploy a brigade headquartered at Makeni, with battalions located at Port Loko, Magburaka and Kabala. In the south, ECOMOG will locate its brigade headquarters at Bo and deploy battalions at Moyamba, Pujehun and Kenema. Naval assets would also be required. The eastern sector is described as strategic in view of its mineral resources, the presence of heavy RUF and Kamajor concentration, and the border with Liberia. ECOMOG therefore considers that operations in the east could prove difficult and risky and demand a robust approach, alertness and deployment in strength. Battalions would be located at Yengema, Zimmi and Kailahun.

24. ECOMOG would also establish a disarmament committee which would be charged, inter alia, with selecting disarmament sites; setting standards and guidelines

for disarmament; conducting the disarmament, coordination of resources and cooperation with other organizations; classifying and transporting recovered weapons and ammunition; disseminating information about the process and providing security for all participants. A ceasefire violations committee and a humanitarian services committee would also be created.

25. My Special Envoy and his staff are actively discussing with the Government and with ECOMOG the further elaboration and implementation of its concept of operations, which provides a suitable basis for the possible subsequent deployment of United Nations military personnel, subject to the authorization of the Security Council. I will revert to the Council with further recommendations on such deployment following a further assessment by my Special Envoy.

Other action taken pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997)

26. Since my previous report, a number of States have written to me, in compliance with paragraph 13 of resolution 1132 (1997), concerning the steps they have taken to give effect to the provisions contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution relating to the sanctions imposed by the Council on Sierra Leone. The latest list of those States can be found in a separate report to the Security Council contained in document S/1998/112.

27. In a letter dated 9 March 1998 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1998/215), the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the United Nations conveyed a request from his Government for the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the importation of petroleum and petroleum products into the country in paragraph 6 of resolution 1132 (1997). On 16 March, the Council adopted resolution 1156 (1998) terminating, with immediate effect, the prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products referred to in resolution 1132 (1997).

III. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

28. A number of United Nations humanitarian assessment missions have now been undertaken to Freetown, Kambia, Bo, Kenema and Makeni. These missions determined that the current humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone remains serious. The primary health care system has been devastated by lack of supplies, looting and the exodus of medical personnel at all levels. Widespread neglect of water and sanitation facilities has increased the exposure of hundreds of thousands to disease. The normal distribution of food to vulnerable groups has been disrupted, affecting children in particular. Many children have also suffered exposure to acts of violence by being sent into battle as combatants. The public education system has collapsed; all schools have been closed since the coup d'état last May. The combination of fighting and looting has led to extensive damage to housing and infrastructure in the provincial towns. The number of internally displaced people has increased, and the welfare of some 14,000 Liberian refugees remains a matter of concern, as many fled from their camps during the recent fighting. The majority of Sierra Leoneans who took refuge in Conakry during the fighting in Freetown have returned. However, some 24,000 Sierra Leoneans have arrived in Liberia since mid-February and the

influx continues, albeit at a reduced rate. A further influx of 3,000 refugees from the Kailahun area, still not under ECOMOG control, has been registered by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at its camp in Kissidougou, Guinea.

29. United Nations agencies prepared a consolidated inter-agency flash appeal, which was launched on 3 March 1998. Through this appeal, I am seeking financial contributions from Member States in the amount of $11.2 million to meet priority humanitarian needs in Sierra Leone over the next three months. Priority needs include support to agriculture through the provision of seeds and tools, the re-establishment of basic health and education services, the resumption of food aid distributions and the provision of assistance and protection to the most vulnerable groups affected by the current conflict. The flash appeal complements the 90-day programme of the Government of Sierra Leone, which serves as a framework for action following the restoration of democratic civilian rule in the country.

30. The full deployment of ECOMOG and the restoration of the legitimate Government is expected to provide increased opportunities for the humanitarian community to accelerate its activities in response to the humanitarian crisis in Sierra Leone, and will also encourage the return to their homes of internally displaced persons. It is hoped that the international community will contribute generously to the humanitarian programme outlined in the flash appeal, in order to provide the crucial assistance needed to sustain lives and to promote stability in Sierra Leone.

31. Medium-term tasks, such as the assisted repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees and reintegration of ex-combatants, are not covered in the flash appeal. However, United Nations agencies are already re-establishing their offices in Freetown and are eager to restart their social and economic development programmes, important components of which must be the re-building of the capacity of the Government of Sierra Leone to deliver services, stimulate economic recovery and promote national reconciliation and reconstruction.

Commencement of the repatriation of refugees

32. At the request of President Kabbah, and with the help of a donation of $120,000 from the Government of Japan, UNHCR has begun to prepare for the repatriation from Conakry of up to 5,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, including 200 civil servants who fled Freetown after the May coup d'état and who will be engaged in the administration of the country.

33. ECOMOG control of major towns in southern Sierra Leone is also likely to encourage the early repatriation by road of Sierra Leonean refugees from Liberia. It is further expected that the removal of the junta could lead to the repatriation of the 400,000 Sierra Leonean refugees in the West African subregion.

34. Of the total caseload of Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone, some 2,800 have thus far been re-registered with UNHCR, about half of them requesting repatriation. UNHCR has begun making arrangements for them to be repatriated by sea.

United Nations Development Programme mission to Sierra Leone

35. A multi-unit mission to Sierra Leone dispatched by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has proposed four projects for immediate implementation following their approval by the Government. These are:

(a) A start-up project for the demobilization of various categories of combatants;

(b) Support for national institutions to enable a rapid return to normal functioning;

(c) Resettlement with emphasis on quick-impact micro-projects, reconciliation and youth development;

(d) Awareness-raising in order to help the country come to terms with the problems it faces and to promote national reconciliation and peace-building.

36. The mission is also assisting the Government to prepare a document for a donors' consultation proposed to be held in Brussels on 31 March 1998. UNDP plans to close its Coordination Office in Conakry by the end of March if the security situation continues to stabilize, and to return the staff of its Country Office to Freetown.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

37. The developments that have taken place in Sierra Leone since the submission of my last report should be seen as positive in the context of the wider situation in which they transpired. The removal of the junta by the action of ECOMOG has opened the way for the re-establishment not just of the legitimate Government, but also of civil order, the democratic process and the beginnings of economic and social development. The return of President Kabbah to Freetown on 10 March therefore presents the people of Sierra Leone and the international community with a challenge and an opportunity which must be grasped with a sense of urgency. We must not let slip the chance to restore Sierra Leone to the ranks of democratic nations and to help strengthen the stability of the subregion.

38. I commend the consistent diplomacy of ECOWAS and, in particular, its Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, and the contribution made by ECOMOG officers and men to the removal of the military junta. I call on ECOWAS and ECOMOG to continue their efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 1132 (1997) and of the Charter of the United Nations. Sierra Leoneans committed to the democratic system also played their part in maintaining a stubborn resistance to the illegal regime. These included not only the members of the Civil Defence Forces, but also countless unarmed civilians who persistently withheld their cooperation from the regime and denied it legitimacy. I salute the courage of the Sierra Leonean people and honour the memory of those who died opposing the junta.

39. I also congratulate President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on his resumption of his responsibilities as Head of State of Sierra Leone following his return. The United Nations should give his Government every possible assistance in its efforts to promote national reconciliation among his people and to strengthen the authority and capacity of his Government.

40. As I stated in my message to the annual summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Harare, and in the special message which was delivered by my Special Envoy, Mr. Ibrahima Fall, on the occasion of President Kabbah's return, Africa can no longer tolerate or accept as faits accomplis coups d'état against elected Governments or the illegal seizure of power by military cliques.

Strengthening the office of the Special Envoy

41. In order to take full and prompt advantage of the changed situation, I wish to propose a comprehensive set of measures to assist the Government and people of Sierra Leone in both their immediate and longer-term needs. As a first step, I intend to strengthen the office of my Special Envoy in Freetown. In order to contribute to the restoration of respect for the rule of law, civil order and human rights in Sierra Leone, I have consulted with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the possible deployment of human rights observers. In the meantime, a human rights officer will be attached to the office of my Special Envoy at an early date.

42. I am also considering attaching to the office two civilian police officials to advise the Government on police training and procedures in a democratic society. An additional political officer and a military adviser would assist my Special Envoy in his consultations with ECOMOG on the development of planning for disarmament and demobilization, while a humanitarian officer would facilitate the coordination of activities of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations in Sierra Leone and advise my Special Envoy on all issues involving non-governmental organizations. The office will also require a public information programme to disseminate information among the population about its activities, in particular in connection with the disarmament and demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegration into society.

Deployment of military liaison personnel

43. I also recommend the deployment to Sierra Leone of up to 10 United Nations military liaison officers, whose functions would be as follows:

(a) To liaise closely with ECOMOG and to report on the military situation in the country;

(b) To ascertain the state of and to assist in the finalization of planning by ECOMOG for future tasks such as the identification of the former combatant elements to be disarmed and the design of a disarmament plan.

44. Should the Security Council decide to authorize the deployment of these military liaison officers, as well as the military and civilian police advisers, as indicated in my third report (S/1998/103, para. 35), the costs relating

thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the special account to be established for Sierra Leone. The related cost estimates will be issued shortly as an addendum to the present report.

45. The military liaison team would complement the role of the military advisers who will, under the authority of my Special Envoy, continue to assist the Government of Sierra Leone to resolve issues related to the disarmament process. The military advisers will also be instrumental in assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in the development of planning for bilateral programmes to restructure and rebuild appropriate security forces for Sierra Leone in the future. In view of the importance of such retraining, I appeal to potential donors to show generosity in providing bilateral assistance.

46. The presence of United Nations military liaison officers, perhaps later supplemented by human rights observers, could also assist in the process of national reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Their close cooperation with ECOMOG in the countryside and their impartial reporting to my Special Envoy would reassure former combatants that they can surrender their weapons in safety.

Provision of humanitarian assistance

47. The provision of humanitarian assistance must also proceed expeditiously. The plight of Sierra Leoneans deprived of food, medical care and shelter by the recent fighting and the abuses of junta rule is acute, and it must be addressed as a matter of urgency with all the resources available to the aid agencies. While I remain deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in many parts of the country, I am encouraged by news that humanitarian needs are beginning to be addressed. Food aid and emergency medical supplies have entered the country through the port of Freetown and have been delivered to some provinces by plane, helicopter and overland in a prompt and coordinated manner.

Contributions to the Trust Fund

48. I call on Member States to display generosity in contributing to the Trust Fund for Sierra Leone which, with the encouragement of the Security Council, I have established. My appreciation goes to the Government of the United Kingdom, which has already announced its readiness to contribute £2 million, and has been actively assisting in the provision of aid to Sierra Leoneans. I also urge all Member States to provide generous assistance to ECOMOG to enable it to meet its logistical requirements and to fulfil its mandate in Sierra Leone.

49. The events that have taken place in Sierra Leone over the past year carry a warning that similar crises may arise and challenge the international community to consider how it should respond to them. Democracy in Sierra Leone may have deep roots, but it is a fragile plant and must be nurtured. The international community must maintain its vigilance and support, not least in the prompt provision of emergency bilateral and multilateral aid. Assistance for the laudable efforts of ECOWAS and the logistical requirements of ECOMOG as it continues its deployment through the countryside will also be required. I trust that such support will be forthcoming.

Map No. 3902 Rev. 2 UNITED NATIONS
January 1997

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UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/53/89
S/1998/250
18 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Item 113 (b) of the preliminary list*
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 18 March 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by the President of the Republic of Serbia, H.E. Mr. Milan Milutinovic, on the political process in Kosovo and Metohija.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 113 (b) of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/53/50.

ANNEX

Statement dated 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the political process in Kosovo and Metohija

Hesitation with, and the postponement of, the beginning of direct political dialogue between the representatives of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and Albanian political parties in Kosovo and Metohija is unjustified and harmful. It postpones the elimination of tension and blocks the political process of the solution of the questions on which depends the realization of equality of all citizens and the affirmation of peace, tolerance and mutual respect in Kosovo and Metohija.

I call on the leaders of the political parties of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija to commence political dialogue without postponement or conditioning. In my capacity of President of the Republic of Serbia, I am ready to be guarantor of such talks on the principle of preserving the territorial integrity and including in the agenda the questions of self-government in Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia.

Political means and a peaceful road are the only ones acceptable for the solution of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija. It is only through dialogue that lasting solutions to all problems can be achieved in which the main point of departure is the realization of the principle of equality of all citizens, including also the equal rights of members of national minorities, in accordance with the highest international standards of the United Nations, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

I emphasize the importance of the continued involvement and presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the realization of humanitarian activities. The competent authorities will guarantee all conditions for its normal work also in the future.

I consider that the international community, in particular the countries of the region, should refrain, pursuant to international standards, from everything that increases tension and encourages separatism or constitutes interference in our internal affairs.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a European country, is committed to the values and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Document and the Paris Charter and has opted for active participation in contemporary integrative processes. Serbia, within the FR of Yugoslavia, is interested in, and open to, cooperation with OSCE, which implies restoration of membership rights and obligations to our country, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To that end, cooperation should be renewed with the OSCE mission of longer duration on a contractual basis, similar to the former mission, the work of which in 1992 showed positive results and presented the picture of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija to the international community with greater objectivity.

The education of the young generation is one of the most important existential questions. I therefore invite the 3 + 3 Group to proceed immediately with the implementation of the Agreement on Education Normalization. It will be a stimulus also to the solution of other questions and a successful realization of the rights and interests of all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija.

I emphasize my conviction that the future of the citizens in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as in Serbia and in our entire country, is not in ethnic, religious or cultural self-isolation and divisions, but in peace, equality, interlinkage and common life.

I am confident that all citizens and the responsible political forces of Serbia and our country as a whole support the policy of equality of citizens, preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity and open and equitable cooperation with other countries and the international community.

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A/53/89*
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18 March 1998

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-third session
Item 113 (b) of the preliminary list**
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Letter dated 18 March 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

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(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* Reissued for technical reasons.

** A/53/50.

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I call on the leaders of the political parties of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija to commence political dialogue without postponement or conditioning. In my capacity of President of the Republic of Serbia, I am ready to be guarantor of such talks on the principle of preserving the territorial integrity and including in the agenda the questions of self-government in Kosovo and Metohija within Serbia.

Political means and a peaceful road are the only ones acceptable for the solution of the problems in Kosovo and Metohija. It is only through dialogue that lasting solutions to all problems can be achieved in which the main point of departure is the realization of the principle of equality of all citizens, including also the equal rights of members of national minorities, in accordance with the highest international standards of the United Nations, OSCE and the Council of Europe.

I emphasize the importance of the continued involvement and presence of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the realization of humanitarian activities. The competent authorities will guarantee all conditions for its normal work also in the future.

I consider that the international community, in particular the countries of the region, should refrain, pursuant to international standards, from everything that increases tension and encourages separatism or constitutes interference in our internal affairs.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a European country, is committed to the values and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Helsinki Document and the Paris Charter and has opted for active participation in contemporary integrative processes. Serbia, within the FR of Yugoslavia, is interested in, and open to, cooperation with OSCE, which implies restoration of membership rights and obligations to our country, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To that end, cooperation should be renewed with the OSCE mission of longer duration on a contractual basis, similar to the former mission, the work of which in 1992 showed positive results and presented the picture of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija to the international community with greater objectivity.

The education of the young generation is one of the most important existential questions. I therefore invite the 3 + 3 Group to proceed immediately with the implementation of the Agreement on Education Normalization. It will be a stimulus also to the solution of other questions and a successful realization of the rights and interests of all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija.

I emphasize my conviction that the future of the citizens in Kosovo and Metohija, as well as in Serbia and in our entire country, is not in ethnic, religious or cultural self-isolation and divisions, but in peace, equality, interlinkage and common life.

I am confident that all citizens and the responsible political forces of Serbia and our country as a whole support the policy of equality of citizens, preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity and open and equitable cooperation with other countries and the international community.

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Security Council

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S/1998/251
19 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that the Security Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Mahamadou Abou, Deputy Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, during the Council's discussion of the item entitled, "Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991, from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America (S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309 and S/23317)", to be held on 20 March 1998.

(Signed) Makarim WIBISONO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07160 (E) 190398

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/252
19 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BAHRAIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request the Security Council to extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, to H.E. Mr. Hussein Hassouna, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations, during the Security Council's formal open debate on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which will take place on Friday, 20 March 1998.

(Signed) Jassim M. BUALLAY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07136 (E) 190398

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/253
19 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GABON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to request that, during the meeting of the Security Council devoted to the consideration of the question of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, the Council extend an invitation, under rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, to H.E. Mr. Amadou Kebe, Permanent Observer of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations.

(Signed) Denis Dangue REWAKA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Gabon
to the United Nations

98-07142 (E) 190398

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/254
20 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Expressing its firm commitment to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 March 1998 (S/1998/236),

Deploring the failure by the União para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) to complete the implementation of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) according to the timetable approved by the Joint Commission on 9 January 1998 (S/1998/56),

Taking note of the declaration by UNITA on the complete demilitarization of its forces as of 6 March 1998 (S/1998/236, paragraph 5) and of the declaration by the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) on 11 March 1998 legalizing the status of UNITA as a political party (S/1998/236, paragraph 5),

1. Stresses the urgent need for the GURN and in particular UNITA to complete immediately and without conditions the implementation of all remaining obligations under the "Acordos de Paz" (S/22609, annex), the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant Security Council resolutions, and demands that UNITA stops its pattern of delays and linkages;

2. Calls on the GURN and in particular UNITA to complete immediately their obligations in the areas of demobilization of all remaining military elements of UNITA, normalization of State administration throughout the national territory, transformation of Radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility as well as disarmament of the civilian population;

3. Endorses the planned visit by the Chairman of the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) to Angola and other interested countries to discuss the full and effective implementation of the measures specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997) with a view to urging compliance by UNITA

with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and relevant Security Council resolutions;

4. Calls upon all Member States to implement fully and without delay the measures specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997), reiterates its request that Member States having information on flights and other actions prohibited in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997) provide this information to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), and requests the Secretary-General to report on these violations by UNITA and certain Member States in the report referred to in paragraph 8 below;

5. Reaffirms its readiness to review the measures specified in paragraph 4 of resolution 1127 (1997) or to consider the imposition of additional measures in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 1127 (1997);

6. Endorses the recommendation of the Secretary-General to resume the gradual downsizing of the military component of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) before 30 April 1998, with the understanding that the withdrawal of all formed military units, with the exception of one infantry company, the helicopter unit and the signals and medical support units, will be completed as soon as conditions on the ground permit, but no later than 1 July 1998;

7. Decides to increase gradually and as needed the number of civilian police observers, giving special emphasis to their language qualifications, by up to 83, to assist the GURN and UNITA to resolve disputes during the normalization of State administration, identify and investigate allegations of abuse, and facilitate the training of the Angolan National Police according to internationally accepted standards, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the modus operandi of the civilian police component under review and to report by 17 April 1998 on whether its tasks can be performed on the basis of a more limited increase in the number of personnel or with a reconfiguration of existing personnel;

8. Takes note of the recommendations contained in section IX of the report of the Secretary-General of 13 March 1998, and requests the Secretary-General to report by 17 April 1998 on the status of the implementation of the peace process, with final recommendations regarding the modalities of the United Nations presence in Angola after 30 April 1998, including the exit strategy and expected termination date of MONUA and the follow-on activities by the United Nations, after the termination of MONUA, to consolidate the peace process and assist in the social and economic recovery of Angola;

9. Strongly condemns the attacks by members of UNITA on MONUA personnel and on Angolan national authorities, and demands that UNITA immediately stop such attacks, cooperate fully with MONUA and guarantee unconditionally the safety and freedom of movement of MONUA and other international personnel;

10. Calls on the GURN to continue to give priority to peaceful actions that contribute to the successful conclusion of the peace process and to refrain

from any action, including the excessive use of force, which might undermine the process of normalization of State administration or lead to renewed hostilities;

11. Stresses the importance of strengthening the rule of law, including the full protection of all Angolan citizens throughout the national territory;

12. Urges the GURN and in particular UNITA to cooperate fully with the National Institute for the Removal of Unexploded Ordnance and provide information on minefields, and urges also the international community to continue to provide assistance to the demining programme;

13. Reiterates its belief that a meeting between the President of the Republic of Angola and the leader of UNITA could accelerate the process of peace and national reconciliation, and urges the UNITA leadership to move to Luanda, as agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocol;

14. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the personnel of MONUA for assisting the Government of Angola and UNITA to implement the peace process;

15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 18 March 1998 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 18 March 1998 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex, which contains a letter dated 5 March 1998 from His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, and a summary of the statement made by President Denktaş in connection with the peace initiative of the Turkish Cypriot side for the settlement of the Cyprus issue, could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tuluy TANÇ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

98-07204 (E) 230398

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ANNEX

Letter dated 18 March 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of a letter dated 5 March 1998 addressed by His Excellency Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, to the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, and a summary of the statement made by President Denktaş during a press conference held on 6 March 1998 in connection with the peace initiative of the Turkish Cypriot side for the settlement of the Cyprus issue.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its appendices circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

APPENDIX I

Letter dated 5 March 1998 from Mr. Rauf Denktaş addressed to Mr. Glafcos Clerides

I would like to start this letter by congratulating you on your re-election as the Greek Cypriot President. It seems that there is still a need for the contribution of our generation to help our two peoples to live side by side in peace.

I am sure you will agree with me that we both continue to carry an historic responsibility to find a new approach for the final settlement of the basic questions which have burdened us for the past 34 years. We both remember well the sad events which brought us to this point. At this critical moment I wish to focus on the future.

I am convinced that the best way to build a better future is first to reach a common understanding on the guiding principles which will shape that future. Sincere commitment to those principles by both parties will give each side the hope and the assurance that the outcome will be responsive to their rights, needs and interests.

The fundamental point in the circumstances of Cyprus is clearly the sovereign equality of the two sides based on the principles of symmetry and mutual respect. This means the recognition by each party that the other is equally entitled to the rights and privileges that it enjoys and wants for itself. An unambiguous mutual commitment to these parameters can reverse the escalation of the conflict and break the vicious circle that has imprisoned both of our peoples over the years. It can also help the two sides bridge the gap between the uncertainties of the present and their hopes for the future.

In shaping our future the basic requirement is realism. Realism in Cyprus starts with the recognition of the fact that the independence and the sovereignty of Cyprus were entrusted in 1960 to the Turkish Cypriot people and the Greek Cypriot people as the two founding partners of the "Republic of Cyprus", with equal political status. Their separate rights to self-determination were explicitly recognized in 1956 and 1958 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and subsequently by the United Nations. In other words, neither party can be the Government of the other or the Government of the whole island.

The second indispensable aspect of the same fact is the balance established between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus under the 1960 agreements. Two important prerequisites stem from these realities:

(a) Neither of the two sides have exclusive rights over the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus;

(b) The balance established between Turkey and Greece has to be respected and preserved.

The 1960 partnership State was destroyed in 1963 by the Greek Cypriot side. This was also an attempt to destroy the balance between Turkey and Greece which culminated in the 1974 coup designed to annex the island to Greece.

In the face of these grave developments, the Turkish Cypriot people set up their own administration under the Vice-President of Cyprus and later, in exercise of their equal sovereign rights and after a long evolutionary process, established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983. At the same time, they have insisted on the observance of the balance between Turkey and Greece.

It is not my intention to go into history. But I must point out that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared two decades after striving for the restoration of the partnership State, eight years after the population exchange agreement with you and only after the United Nations-facilitated talks for a political settlement were frustrated by the Greek Cypriot side.

The failure to reach a federal settlement, despite many years of negotiations, during which time your side flourished under the usurped and fictitious title of the 'Government of Cyprus' at the expense of our political and economic rights, and the ever-deepening mistrust resulting from this, have made such a solution untenable. Indeed, the Greek Cypriot side has repeatedly declared that it was not interested in a federal settlement as envisaged by the Secretary-General. The expectation that European Union membership would help you fulfil your selfish designs has resulted in your side-stepping a United Nations-facilitated solution by rejecting even the United Nations set of ideas.

I want to remind you that your unilateral European Union application and the treatment by the European Union of this application, under the influence of Greece, as a bona fide valid application for the whole of Cyprus have been, for us, the latest and gravest evidence that you have no intention of respecting our rights and creating a new and workable partnership. Successive embargo policies of the Greek Cypriot Government, the denial of our equal political rights and a readiness to resort to the use of force to impose your will, have demonstrated adequately your obsession with accomplishing your declared aim of completely Hellenizing Cyprus and dominating the Turkish Cypriot people.

These activities have been accompanied by efforts to undermine further the balance between Turkey and Greece. The adoption and the persistent implementation of the joint military doctrine with Greece, the opening of the Paphos airbase to station Greek combat aircraft and the prospective deployment of sophisticated S-300 missiles put in jeopardy the security and stability of the island, as well as the eastern Mediterranean.

Your departure from the agreed parameters of the negotiating process, clearly manifested in your rejection of the United Nations set of ideas, the unilateral European Union membership process you embarked upon in total disregard of the stipulation of the relevant treaties and the military activities you have undertaken have rendered the search for a federal settlement even more illusory. Under the prevailing conditions, insistence on such a solution can even be dangerous. The path you have taken by departing from the basis of the 1960 'state of affairs', namely the internal balance between our

two peoples and the external balance between the two guarantor motherlands promises nothing but further tension.

In spite of all this and the fact that previous negotiating experiences have been very costly for the Turkish Cypriot people, we still want peace and cooperation on the island as well as peace and cooperation between Turkey and Greece.

As we approach the year 2000, I believe we have to make a new beginning on the basis of the realities I referred to above. As a result of what has happened over the years, we now have two fully functioning democratic states on the island, each with its own people, territory and effective government, neither one having the legal or moral rights to claim to be the government of the other. Efforts to build a worthwhile future for both our peoples must therefore be based on the acknowledgement of the existence and equal status of our respective states. What needs to be done now is to work out an arrangement which will enable the two states to resolve certain basic matters, specifically the final settlement of reciprocal property claims, security issues and the delineation of borders. If we can do this, we will have achieved a new platform upon which the two peoples of the island and their states can peacefully coexist without claims against one another. When the two sides do reach this stage and create a climate of confidence then they may be in a position to visualize a joint future.

The time has come for both of us to show the necessary leadership so that future generations do not go through the bitter experiences that both you and I have endured, and instead equally benefit, in peace, mutual respect and cooperation, from the many opportunities that our island and region generously offer. Our primary aim must be the immediate achievement of a working relationship between our two states so that peace, stability and mutual trust can be secured and the danger of a new conflict is averted.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

APPENDIX II

Summary of the statement made by Mr. Rauf Denktaş during a press conference on 6 March 1998

I look to the future of Cyprus with optimism. I believe that it is possible to make Cyprus a bridge of peace between the two guarantor motherlands through a balanced settlement.

If the structure established in 1960 in the form of an internal and external balance had not been destroyed with the objective of converting Cyprus into a Greek Cypriot republic, today there would have been no issue called the Cyprus issue.

Our efforts for the past 34 years to re-establish this balance have to rest on a realistic foundation.

In the circumstances in Cyprus today, sovereign equality based on mutual respect and a symmetry in relations has to be the basic starting point. We can embed these fundamentals, which constitute the basis of the 1960 Agreements, on a new foundation.

With the letter I sent to Mr. Clerides yesterday I have taken a new initiative towards the establishment of peace, stability and confidence between the two peoples and two states on the island.

Our efforts undertaken for building the future must be based on the acknowledgement of the existence and equal status of the two peoples and two states.

I propose to Mr. Clerides that we settle certain fundamental issues before us. These issues are the final settlement of reciprocal property claims, security issues and the delineation of borders. Once these issues are settled, we will reach the phase where it is possible to shape and visualize a joint future.

There is the need for a new approach and a new beginning. Only then can we attain a new Cyprus where the two peoples will live side by side in peace and security.

Our peoples desire peace. With this new initiative I am calling upon Mr. Clerides to join me in establishing a realistic peace and a new Cyprus. If we refrain from actions which overlook this reality, the road to bridges of goodwill will be opened.

I hope that Mr. Clerides will not fail to demonstrate this political will. We have before us a new and historical opportunity. We must use this opportunity jointly.

This morning I learned that Mr. Clerides refused to receive my letter. I regard this as a missed opportunity for Mr. Clerides. He has alleged that my views did not conform with the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements.

I ask whether the Greek Cypriot side's unilateral bid for European Union membership is in accordance with the high-level agreements, which stipulate the non-alignment of Cyprus. Or is the construction of the military airbase in Paphos for use by Greece and the deployment of S-300 missiles in accordance with these agreements? It is very unfortunate for Mr. Clerides that he is attempting to realize full membership in the European Union in the shadow of the S-300 missiles.

Today I do not want to talk about such matters any further. I call upon Mr. Clerides to seize this opportunity rather than letting it pass by. I ask him not to overlook these realistic proposals, which will assist us in establishing a future which will benefit both peoples in Cyprus.

I have also informed the Secretary-General regarding my letter and proposals. I am addressing the international community. A historic opportunity has arisen for the settlement of a 34-year-old question, the attainment of peace and stability in the region, the prevention of new issues of discord and the realization of a new Cyprus. Let us join together in seizing this opportunity.

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QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 3 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 3 March 1998 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 3 March 1998 from Mr. Avtuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 17 February 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations which contains allegations regarding cultural property in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (A/52/794-S/1998/133).

The Greek Cypriot representative once again refers to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an "occupied area". I wish to underline that the only occupation in Cyprus is the 35-year-old usurpation and occupation of the legitimate seat of government of the once bi-communal Republic of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriot regime in the South.

Unfounded allegations of the "systematic plundering" of cultural property in Northern Cyprus have been amply dealt with in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 22 January 1998 (A/52/778-S/1998/74). I will therefore confine myself to highlighting the salient aspects of the matter in question.

Contrary to what is claimed, it is the Greek Cypriot side that has always tried to eradicate all traces of the Turkish-Muslim heritage of Cyprus, in particular during the years between 1963 and 1974, when they attempted to "cleanse" the island of its ethnic Turkish population through brute violence and oppression. During this tragic period, mosques, shrines and other places of Muslim worship in 103 villages across the island were destroyed. Today, the Greek Cypriot administration is still perpetuating a policy of religious intolerance and showing undisguised contempt towards the Islamic heritage in South Cyprus.

Regarding the allegations made in the said letter of the Greek Cypriot representative over the conversion of a number of churches into mosques or their being given new functions related to the needs of contemporary life, it should be re-emphasized that conservation of historic buildings through use is not only permissible but also recommended under relevant international instruments.

One cannot help but ponder the question as to what the Greek Cypriot representative, who readily notes the argument concerning the reuse of historic buildings, would have to say about the Greek Cypriot side's wilful destruction of 103 mosques during the period from 1963 to 1974 and whether that action conforms to the "international law" and relevant conventions that he so keenly pays lip service to.

The Turkish Cypriot side has done and is doing everything within its means to preserve the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot authorities have invited international organizations to extend financial and technical assistance to Northern Cyprus with a view to supporting its efforts towards the preservation of its cultural heritage. The Greek Cypriot side, for

its part, is doing its utmost to prevent these international organizations from extending any assistance to Northern Cyprus. This is a clear illustration of the hypocrisy and insincerity of the Greek Cypriot administration.

The Greek Cypriot side has systematically attacked, destroyed or treated with utter disrespect cultural and religious monuments, places of worship and other elements of culture belonging to the Turkish-Muslim heritage of the island. In view of the above, the Greek Cypriot side's allegations regarding cultural property appear to be an attempt to cover up its own misdeeds, past and present, in Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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20 March 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE NIGER TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Niger to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the note dated 8 January 1998 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1132 (1997) concerning Sierra Leone, has the honour to inform him that the Government of the Niger has decided to implement the provisions of the aforesaid resolution.

98-07336 (E) 200398 200398

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19 March 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC AND ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit herewith a cable message addressed to the Security Council from His Excellency Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister of External Relations, concerning the Eritrean military aggression against the Sudanese territories on the country's eastern borders.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Elfatih ERWA
Permanent Representative

98-07343 (E) 200398 200398

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Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Letter dated 18 March 1998 from the Minister of External Relations of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council

With reference to our previous letters to the Security Council regarding the repeated and consecutive Eritrean acts of aggression against the Sudanese territories, I regret to inform you and other distinguished members of the Security Council that Eritrean aggression and violations of the territories of the Sudan and Sudanese civilian targets are continuing. The stable Sudanese villages located on the border with Eritrea have become military battlefields and targets for the Eritrean attacks, which have caused serious human and material losses.

I should like to convey to this august body some details of the recent Eritrean aggression against the Sudanese territories during February and March, as follows:

1. On 26 February 1998, the Sudanese troops at Al-Garada, Shellalob, Al-Lafa, Abu-Qamal and Al-Gargaf were subjected to heavy Eritrean artillery shelling from within the Eritrean territories for a continuous period of five hours, from 5.30 to 10.30 a.m.; this shelling has caused vast human losses and destruction of civilian property. The shelling was preceded by a massive offensive supported by tanks and armed vehicles against the Al-Gargaf region where a small Sudanese force was stationed. The attack resulted in the occupation of the region and the killing of a number of our troops; others were wounded. Our troops recaptured the region in a counter-offensive after 72 hours.

2. On 1 March 1998 at 1230 hours, the Al-Lafa camp was subjected to intensive shelling by 122-mm rocket launchers from within the Eritrean territories. As a result of this shelling, a number of civilians were wounded by fragments of the rocket launchers.

3. On the same day, 1 March, at 8.30 a.m., an Eritrean military contingent seized a tanker vehicle at the Wad Sherifi camp in the Gunfer region belonging to the refugee commission, after killing the driver at the scene of the incident in the Sharaf Abu Agla region.

4. On 4 March at 6 a.m., the Eritrean forces continued shelling from within the Eritrean borders for a period of three hours at the villages of Awad and Galasa, causing destruction of the water tanker and a school building. The shelling of these villages resumed at 1230 hours, including shelling at the village of Hafarat for 10 minutes. This shelling was launched by 120-mm mortars, 122-mm howitzers and 122-mm rocket launchers.

The Sudan has observed and continues to observe the highest possible degree of self-restraint, paying due consideration to the maintenance of regional peace and security, but self-restraint has its limits. If Eritrean aggression

continues, the Government of the Sudan reserves its full legitimate right to defend its own territories and citizens.

In bringing to your attention the details of these attacks, the Government of the Sudan requests the Security Council to draw the attention of the Eritrean regime to the need to abide by Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and to refrain from its acts of aggression, which will lead to the destabilization of regional peace and security.

In conclusion, I request that the content of this letter be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail
Minister of External Relations

H.E. Mr. Abdoulie Momodou Sallah
President of the Security Council
Permanent Representative of Gambia
to the United Nations

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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20 March 1998
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LETTER DATED 19 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement issued on 15 March 1998 by the Presidency of the European Union on Brčko (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) John WESTON
Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom to the United Nations

98-07349 (E) 200398 200398

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on Brčko issued on 15 March 1998 by the Presidency of the European Union

The European Union welcomes the High Representative's announcement on 15 March 1998 on the decision on Brčko by the Arbitral Tribunal to maintain the status quo under the present international supervision arrangements and to defer the final arbitration award to early 1999. The European Union commends the efforts of the Presiding Arbitrator, Mr. Roberts Owen, to pursue a just and fair solution, with coordinated support from the international community.

By maintaining the status quo under international supervision for the present, the decision should reassure the parties of fair and equal treatment while maintaining the impetus for accelerated implementation of Dayton/Paris provisions, notably on refugee return. The European Union expects the parties to remain engaged in dialogue to meet their obligations under the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement.

Specifically, the European Union calls on all parties to implement unreservedly the Arbitral Tribunal's decision. The European Union expects all those concerned to use the interval of time given to them to uphold their commitments to implement all aspects of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement, including allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes. To that end, the European Union is firmly committed to continuing its support for reconstruction and reconciliation.

The European Union will continue to support the efforts of the High Representative and his Deputy, the Supervisor for Brčko, to build a just and pluralist society and to uphold the Brčko decision.

The European Union remains fully committed to the objectives agreed at the Bonn Peace Implementation Council last December for implementation of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement this year and beyond. The Arbitral Tribunal's decision pursues our shared objective of permanent peace, reconciliation and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 11 March 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters, the latest dated 26 February 1998 (A/52/808-S/1998/173), I have the honour to bring to your attention the following grave developments concerning the destruction of the cultural identity of the occupied part of Cyprus.

As you know, the protection, maintenance and restitution of all historic buildings belonging to all faiths in Cyprus, in both the free and Turkish-occupied areas, is of paramount importance to the Government of Cyprus because these historic buildings reflect the unique and varied history and culture of Cyprus.

The photographs enclosed* bear witness to the neglect, destruction and illegal conversion of these holy places and serve to demonstrate how the Turkish occupying forces in northern Cyprus are attempting to destroy historical evidence of Cyprus' diverse cultural identity.

Recently the following grave incidents, as illustrated in the photographs have come to our attention:

1. The ancient Church of Agia Marina in Diorios has been destroyed and is presently used as an animal shed (photographs 5 and 6).

2. The Church of Archangel Michael in Kazafani has been abandoned and allowed to deteriorate and is now in danger of collapsing (photograph 2).

* The photographs may be consulted at the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations.

3. The Church of Agia Marina in Bellapais has been transformed into a mosque (photograph 1).

4. The Church of Saint John in Mia Milia has been transformed into a mosque (photographs 3 and 4).

5. The Monastery of Panagia Apsinthiotissa in Sichari has been abandoned, looted and vandalized. Its precious frescoes have been destroyed (photographs 7, 8 and 9).

6. The Church of Agios Amvrosios in the village of Agios Amvrosios has been transformed into a mosque (photograph 10).

7. The Monastery of Antifonitis in Kalograia has been abandoned, its unique frescoes much damaged (photographs 11 and 12).

The repeated illegal conversions of churches and monasteries into mosques are in violation of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the Declaration on the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, adopted by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1966. These premeditated actions on the part of the Turkish occupying forces in northern Cyprus constitute an affront to civilization and grossly violate the basic human rights of the people of Cyprus, who are culturally and historically bound to these places of worship.

These latest developments are yet another cogent example of Turkey's disrespect for other people's cultural heritage and of the religious intolerance so evident in that country's modern history, and further illustrate Turkey's determination to violently alter the indigenous character of the occupied area of Cyprus. Disregarding all international agreements, violating basic tenets of civilization and desecrating what is sacred and holy to the people of Cyprus, Turkey is proceeding with a calculated, officially sponsored and well-executed plan to cause the disappearance of every trace of a civilization that flourished in these areas for more than 8,000 years.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, I wish once again to protect strongly against these wilful and deliberate acts of destruction and to request that you call upon Turkey to terminate its systematic policy of pillaging and obliterating the island's archaeological, historical and religious monuments.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-second session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sotirios ZACKHEOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1998/261
24 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the text of the letter dated 19 March 1998 addressed to Mr. Ismael Cem, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, by Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Greece, containing the reply of the Government of Greece to the proposals made by the Turkish Government on 11 March 1998 (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Christos ZACHARAKIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07654 (E) 240398

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ANNEX

Letter dated 19 March 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey

In my letter of 20 February, I transmitted to you the response of the Greek Government to the ideas you had conveyed through our Ambassador in Ankara on 12 February 1998.

I regret very much to see that the proposals contained therein were met with a very negative reception, and that the approach suggested there for dealing with outstanding issues was rejected.

I regret most of all that, both in your letter and in the attendant note verbale, your response fails to acknowledge the possibility of addressing the issues in our relations through legal means and international judicial instruments within the framework of international law and treaties.

For our part, we shall remain committed to the effort of channelling our relations through the principles of international law and accepted international practice, and our invitation to Turkey to join us in this effort shall remain valid. In this context, the undeniable fact that Greece has accepted, in very broad and comprehensive terms, the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice indicates the way we will continue to encourage Turkey to do the same and thus have the opportunity to test the validity of various challenges it has seen fit to raise in the Court.

Moreover, I stress that our proposal for a step-by-step approach to resolve issues in a realistic sequence and thus gradually ameliorate relations in a sustained manner with a perspective, remains on the table.

In this context, the invitation to proceed with the delimitation of the continental shelf by referral to the International Court of Justice also remains standing. This remains objectively the only real problem that our two countries have to clear up between them. The importance of such a step in the overall range of our relations has been demonstrated at great length in the past.

However, I have to reiterate that there is no interest in trying to legitimize the subjective situation that Turkey has been trying to create through an open-ended series of claims. The Greek Government has made clear that a political negotiation over those claims, in the form of "comprehensive dialogue", which has been the constant objective of Turkish policy, is not acceptable.

As far as the Madrid joint statement is concerned, it has still not been made clear what kind of formalization the Turkish Government has in mind. The Greek Government considers it important to uphold the spirit as well as the letter of the political statement we have made along the lines I have described in my previous letter. In this context, I would like to mention that a number of official statements issued by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

concerning our present exchange of views included references of a threatening tone which is not consistent with the Madrid undertaking.

I am very glad for your support for the efforts of the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to reduce tension by defining possible confidence-building measures and implementing the 1988 agreements. The process is in development in Brussels and we should not try to preempt it.

The validity of the "group of experts" exercise lies, for both countries, in its character as a European Union initiative. I would urge you to reconsider your position so that its usefulness can be tested.

For my part, I believe that contacts between Ministers at every given opportunity can be useful; I am convinced that exchanges of views on a basis of sincerity and goodwill might help to persuade the Turkish side that we need to proceed on the realistic and constructive approach we have been suggesting towards resolving outstanding issues within a framework of international law. We can thus ameliorate our relations in a way that will enhance security and stability in our area and bring Turkey closer to its European vocation.

I think that the opportunity offered by your eventual presence in Rhodes in May should not be missed.

I am looking forward to seeing you there.

(Signed) Theodoros PANGALOS

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1998/262
24 March 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 23 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of Iraq's airspace by United States aircraft continued over the period from 6 to 15 March 1998 and that the aircraft in question carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation, as set forth in the annex hereto.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq affirms its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State by these actions.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07779 (E) 250398 250398

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Annex

Details of violations of Iraq's airspace and damage caused, 6-15 March 1998

1. In the northern region 50 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Dohuk, Mosul, Amadiyah, Aqrah, Zakho, Irbil and Tall Afar.

2. In the southern region 935 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Ushbayjah, Jalibah, Salman, Busayyah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shinafiyah, Rumaythah, Habariyah, Basra, Hayy, Shatrah, Amarah, Diwaniyah, Rifa'i, Nukhayb, Qal'at Salih, Hamzah, Ali al-Sharqi, Abu Sukhayr, Qala't Sukkar, Safwan and Umm Qasr.

3. Two sorties were flown by United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft at altitudes of 20,000 metres and at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour.

4. At 1016, 1030 and 1105 hours on 2 March 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the areas of Umm Qasr and Faw.

5. At 1435, 1445 and 1030 hours on 3 and 4 March 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the areas of Umm Qasr and Faw.

6. At 1128 hours on 6 March 1998 a formation of two United States aircraft broke the sound barrier over the city of Shu'aybah.

7. At 1515, 1532, 1533, 1550 and 1250 hours on 9 and 10 March 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the areas of Umm Qasr and Faw.

8. At 1315 and 1430 hours on 11 March 1998 United States aircraft violated Iraqi airspace over the areas of Umm Qasr and Faw.

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LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. I refer to the letter dated 16 March 1998 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and the Acting Permanent Representative of the United States (S/1998/239) in response to the letters of 2 and 4 March 1998 addressed to you by the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/1998/179 and S/1998/192) concerning the two judgments delivered by the International Court of Justice on 27 February 1998 in the cases brought by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the United Kingdom and the United States.

Since the communication in question distorts the letter and spirit of the letters to which it refers, ignores the facts established by the Court in the judgments issued by it and seeks to pre-empt the procedures laid down in the Rules of Court, I feel obliged to make the observations set forth hereunder.

2. The letter ignores the fact that, by paragraph [53](1)(a) of the judgment[s], in which it rejects the objection to jurisdiction, the Court determines that there is a dispute between the parties concerning the interpretation and application of the 1971 Montreal Convention.

The letter further ignores the fact that, in the reasons for its judgment[s], the Court finds that the Libyan applications were filed before the adoption of Security Council resolutions 784 (1992) and 883 (1993) and that the case is therefore admissible (para. [53](1)(b) [i.e. 53(2)(b)]) and that the two Security Council resolutions in question do not, in the circumstances of the case, have a preliminary character (para. [53](3) of the judgment[s]). The Court has thus yet to rule on the effect of the aforesaid resolutions on the Libyan applications.

3. When it is determined that there is indeed a dispute with respect to which the Court has jurisdiction, then the dispute is a legal one and it is incumbent on the Security Council to request the parties to submit it to the judicial authorities (arbitration or the courts). Libya submitted the legal dispute to the Court, and the Court responded positively to its view of the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

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4. A party to a dispute that is submitted to the Court, that is found to be admissible by it and with respect to which it has jurisdiction may not resort to another way of resolving the dispute, may not pre-empt the judgment of the Court with regard to its subject-matter and may not discuss matters relating thereto outside the courtroom, as stipulated in the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the statements made in paragraph 5 of document S/1998/239 represent a failure to meet requirements and a departure from judicial procedure and are consequently in violation of the Rules of Court, the Statute of the Court and the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The text of paragraph 42 of the Order of 14 April 1992 [in the case against the United States of America] does not indicate that the Court has reached a definitive opinion of the matter, since it characterizes the conclusions reached by the Court as "provisional" and "prima facie" (emphasis added). Moreover, paragraph 43 of the same Order states that the Court has not at this stage determined the legal effect of Security Council resolution 748 (1992). In determining that the matter is not of a preliminary character, it took into account, as it stated, the circumstances surrounding the Libyan applications and the date they were filed with the Court (i.e. before the adoption of the two resolutions in question).

6. The letter does not make it clear that the only relevant resolution that was adopted by the Security Council before the Libyan applications were filed with the Court is resolution 731 (1992), in which the Council urges Libya to respond to the requests made by the United Kingdom and the United States but mentions no obligations that conflict with Libya's rights under the Convention. The other two resolutions, those providing for sanctions, were adopted after the applications were filed with the Court. The Court has found that those applications are admissible and that it has jurisdiction to consider them, and they remain before the Court for its consideration.

7. The statement made in paragraph 7 of the letter in question is untrue, and the decision of the Court is not entirely procedural because it implies an order relating to resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). The statement made in paragraph 8 of the letter is of no importance because of its failure to meet requirements and because it departs from the two cases submitted to the Court and the two judgments delivered by it.

8. Resolutions adopted by any body whatever that concern an issue that is before the courts, and is therefore subject to a determination that it does not affect the rights of States, should not be implemented when they relate to economic sanctions that affect the lives of peoples and individuals.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abuzed Omar DORDA
Permanent Representative

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24 March 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement of the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued on 19 March 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LI Hyong Chol
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-07697 (E) 240398

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Annex

STATEMENT OF THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ISSUED AT PYONGYANG ON 19 MARCH 1998

Recently, the United States of America has reorganized the Command of the United States Eighth Army stationed in south Korea and the Third Army in the United States mainland into a field army system.

The United States is open in saying that this step is aimed at increasing its combat efficiency and operation capacity in an "emergency".

The United States Eighth Army is the core unit of the United States Army in south Korea. And what the United States said about an "emergency" means an outbreak of a new war against our Republic.

It becomes known to the world that the United States is escalating the tension on the Korean peninsula to an extreme pitch by amassing the latest type of war equipment in south Korea under the pretext of a threat of a fictitious "preemptive strike" from somebody and the existence of a security "vacuum" over the Iraqi crisis.

This time, the United States has used the Iraqi crisis to execute once again the simultaneous reorganization of the Eighth Army in south Korea and Third Army in its mainland into a field army system following the reinforced deployment of the state-of-the-art military equipment in south Korea. This is evidence of the fact that the preparations to provoke a new war against our Republic have gone into a home stretch.

This clearly shows wherein lies the ulterior intention of the United States, which covertly says it is interested in improving Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States relations and in securing peace on the Korean peninsula.

If the United States persistently holds on to its policy of aggressive power and the policy of war, rather than extricating itself from the outmoded thinking in the cold war period, despite the sincere efforts of the Government of our Republic to prevent war and achieve lasting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, it is quite evident what sort of counter-measures we should take against it.

This time, a wartime mobilization order was issued to the whole country and the entire armed forces, including the People's Army, were put into military exercises to cope positively with the United States manoeuvre for war preparations. This fully demonstrates the justness of our self-defensive measure as against the tense situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula.

On the eve of the second round of the "four-party talks", the United States reorganized its core units into a ready-for-action field army system. If it had

thought of gaining something from the current talks by posing a threat of force, it was a very foolish miscalculation.

The United States should clearly recognize that the policy of strength is by no means a panacea for solving problems, and should act with discretion.

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26 March 1998
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LETTER DATED 20 MARCH 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF EL SALVADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to draw your attention to my note dated 16 March 1998, in which I transmitted to you, annexed thereto, the original letter dated 10 March 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, Mr. Ramón E. Gonzalez Giner, addressed to you concerning your successful mission in Iraq (see annex).

I should be very grateful in this connection if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ricardo G. CASTANEDA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-08145 (E) 260398 260398

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ANNEX

Letter dated 10 March 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador addressed to the Secretary-General

It is our pleasure to express to you the appreciation of the people and Government of El Salvador and to extend their congratulations to you for the successful use of your good offices in bringing about a peaceful negotiated solution to the current Iraq crisis.

Your timely and wise action truly demonstrated that situations such as this can be resolved through the diplomatic channel and engender total confidence in the United Nations as an entity for guaranteeing the peaceful settlement of conflicts between States.

We hope that the Government of Iraq fulfils the commitments made to you and the Security Council in order to avoid a possible armed confrontation, which would destabilize harmony and world peace.

The Government of the Republic of El Salvador will carefully follow the progress made towards a settlement of this dispute, in the hope that the necessary resources will continue to be used in order to bring about its felicitous resolution.

(Signed) Ramón E. GONZALEZ GINER
Minister for Foreign Affairs